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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of fiscal policies – as measured by the impact and 
cumulative multipliers – and how they interact with public and private debt. Harnessing the 
moderated panel regression approach, based on the yearly data set of several economies during the 
period from 1996 to 2012, the analysis is focused on the impact of spending-and-revenue-based fiscal 
policies on economic growth and how these fiscal instruments interact with public and private 
indebtedness. The result of spending stimuli advocates the basic Keynesian theory. An increase in 
public expenditures contemporaneously generates a positive multiplier, of around 0.29 – 0.44 and 
around 0.45 – 0.58 during two years. Decomposing the expenditures into their elements, this paper 
documents a stronger impact from public investment than that from government purchases. On the 
other hand, the revenue stimuli seem to follow the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH), arguing 
that current tax cuts are inconsequential. The impact and cumulative multipliers for this fiscal 
instrument have mixed results, ranging from -0.21 to 0.05 and -0.26 to 0.06, respectively. Moreover, 
no robust evidence is found to support the argument that government debt moderates the effectiveness 
of fiscal policies. The size of the multipliers for both spending and revenue policies remain constant 
with the level of public debt. On the other hand, private debt appears to show a statistically significant 
moderating effect on spending stimuli. Its impact on spending multipliers, however, is economically 
insignificant. The moderation effect of private debt on the revenue stimuli does not seem to exist. 
Finally, this paper documents that both public and private debt exhibit a negative and statistically 
significant estimation for economic output. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of fiscal policy’s effectiveness 
has increased during the recent years. Policy 
makers need to know whether their decisions are 
effective in stimulating their economy. Many 
researchers have been investigating this field of 
interest to provide evidence that would be 
beneficial in the decision-making process. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), for instance, find 
that an increase in the output of an economy can 
be the result of positive government spending 
shocks and negative tax shocks. Furthermore, 
tax-based fiscal stimuli are more likely to 
increase growth than spending-based fiscal 
stimuli (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009; Forni, 
Monteforte & Sessa, 2009; Mountford & Uhlig, 
2009). Deciding the most effective fiscal policy, 
however, becomes a more complicated process 
since the size of the fiscal multiplier also 
depends on the business cycle (Baum, 
Poplawski-Ribeiro & Weber, 2012) and country-
specific characteristics, such as the level of 
development, the exchange rate regime, 
openness to trade, public indebtedness, and the 
health of the financial system (Corsetti, Meier& 
Muller, 2012; Ilzetzki, Mendoza & Vegh, 2013). 
More specifically, Favero and Giavazzi 
(2007) emphasise the importance of one of the 
country-specific characteristic in measuring the 
fiscal policy’s impact, which is the level of debt. 
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They show evidence that the absence of a debt 
feedback effect can result in incorrect estimates 
of the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks. Ample 
studies have been conducted to investigate debt’s 
effect on the macroeconomic indicators. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), for instance, 
investigated economic growth and inflation at 
different levels of government and external debt. 
They found that a higher public debt level is 
associated with lower economic growth. Other 
studies of debt level’s impact can be found in the 
works of Curutchet (2006), Kumar and Woo 
(2010), Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 
(2011), Jorda, Schularik, and Taylor (2013), 
Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014), and many 
others. 
The above authors analyse the debt’s effect 
merely from the perspective of the level of 
public debt (central government debt) and/or 
external debt. Besides the level of public debt, 
earlier studies indicate that private debt levels 
might also play a role in determining a fiscal 
policy’s effectiveness. As documented by 
Corsetti, Meier, and Muller (2012), the 
effectiveness of a fiscal policy depends on the 
health of the financial system. In addition, Jorda, 
Schularik, and Taylor (2013) argue that the 
financial stability risks mostly come from private 
sector credit booms, rather than from the 
expansion of public debt. This, therefore, 
suggests a need to look comprehensively at all 
forms of debt and figure out the interplay 
between private and government debt levels in 
determining a fiscal policy’s effectiveness. 
The analysis of private debt’s impact on the 
output of an economy can be found in the work 
of Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) and 
Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014). The former 
investigated at what level public and private debt 
becomes a drag on economic growth. They 
found that the threshold levels of government 
debt, corporate debt, and household debt, at 
which they start damaging growth, are 85 
percent, 90 percent, and 85 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, the latter research looked at the 
interplay between the level of household 
leverage and fiscal stimuli. Analysing data of the 
US economy, they found that output multipliers 
are always higher, in absolute value, when the 
volume of household debt is large. In their paper, 
the authors report that an environment of easy 
access to credit by impatient consumers, or of 
high borrowers’ debt, amplifies the impact 
multipliers of fiscal shocks. 
Based on those above studies, the research 
question in this paper is whether public and 
private debt affects the effectiveness of a fiscal 
policy; this paper will investigate the impact of 
public and private debt levels in determining the 
size of the fiscal multiplier. Instead of viewing 
private debt levels merely from the perspective 
of household debt, this paper will employ data of 
the domestic credit available to the private sector 
as the proxy of private debt. This research, 
therefore, is expected to fill a gap in the 
literature by adding another component of 
private debt that has not been covered in the 
work of Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014). Even 
though Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) 
already include both household and corporate 
debt in the private debt variable, the authors 
view the impact of the debt level merely on the 
output of the economy. They do not relate the 
debt level’s impact on the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy, as the variable of fiscal stimuli is not 
included in their model. Hence, this paper is 
aimed at filling the gap by providing a more 
complete picture pertaining to debt level’s 
impact on fiscal policy’s effectiveness. 
Regarding the fiscal policy variable used in 
the previous paper, Andres, Bosca, and Ferri 
(2014) merely use consumption taxes as the 
proxy of the revenue-based fiscal stimulus. To 
provide a broader picture, this research will 
contribute to the previous paper by evaluating 
the revenue-side fiscal policy proxied by total 
tax revenue. The use of total tax revenue to refer 
to the revenue-based fiscal policy can also be 
found in the paper by Alesina and Ardagna 
(2009). Instead of using data merely from the US 
economy, as previous authors have done, this 
paper will employ the all-countries data 
available in the World Bank’s database; 
therefore, it is expected to provide a broader 
insight into this field. 
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In this paper, a panel regression method will 
be utilised; the same method that was used by 
Almunia et al. (2010) and Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2011). To conduct the analysis, this 
study primarily relies on the World Development 
Indicators database available from the website of 
the World Bank. The database provides a yearly 
dataset of 214 economies from 1960 to 2013. 
The analysis is presented based on a balanced 
panel consisting of 16 economies during the 
period from 1996 to 2012. For the robustness 
check, the analysis is continued, based on an 
unbalanced panel data set by extending the 
cross-sectional series to 39 countries from 1990 
to 2012. Furthermore, this research analyses five 
variables, which are the output of the economy, 
government spending, government revenue, 
public debt, and the level of private debt. 
The result of this paper supports the 
Keynesians’ argument that the increase in 
government spending should be expansionary. 
Government spending generates positive values 
for the impact multiplier, ranging from 0.29 to 
0.44 and for the cumulative multiplier, for two 
years, of between 0.45 and 0.58. Revenue-based 
fiscal policies, on the other hand, seem to follow 
the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, that views 
tax cuts as an inconsequential policy. The impact 
and cumulative multipliers are from -0.21 to 
0.05 and -0.26 to 0.06, respectively. Worthy of 
note, this paper proposes not to solely view the 
spending instrument as a total entity, but one 
should classify government spending into its 
separate elements, as it might lead to different 
results. The decomposing analysis of public 
spending emphasises that increases in public 
investment should be more effective than in 
government consumption/purchases. 
Regarding the impact of debt levels, no 
robust evidence is found to support the argument 
that government debt moderates the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policies. The size of the 
multipliers for both spending and revenue 
policies remain constant with the public debt 
level. On the other hand, private debt appears to 
show a statistically significant moderating effect 
on spending stimuli. Its impact on the spending 
multipliers, however, is economically insigni-
ficant. The moderating effect of private debt on 
revenue stimuli does not seem to be present. 
Finally, this research documents that both public 
and private debt exhibits negative and 
statistically significant estimations of the 
economic output. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Fiscal Multiplier and its Determinants 
The fiscal multiplier is the most commonly used 
term to refer to the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus on the output of an economy. Coenen et 
al. (2012) state that the debate concerning the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus is typically 
conducted in terms of the fiscal multiplier of 
different fiscal measures, which can be classified 
into two main categories, namely an increase in 
government expenditure and a decrease in tax 
rates. The presence of those two fiscal 
instruments raises a key question whether tax 
cuts or spending increases are the better strategy 
for stimulating the economy. 
There are two main theories regarding the 
effect of fiscal instruments on the economy. 
Keynesians, on the one hand, believe that 
increases in government expenditure are 
expected to contribute directly to aggregate 
demand, whilst decreases in tax are presumed to 
stimulate private demand indirectly, by adding to 
the disposable income of the private sector. This 
means that tax cuts are less potent than spending 
increases in stimulating the economy, since 
households may save a significant portion of the 
additional after tax-income (Batini et al., 2014). 
The Keynesian theory, moreover, argues that 
increasing government spending without raising 
taxes, or reducing tax revenues without cutting 
expenditure, will stimulate the total demand. 
Equal changes in both fiscal instruments, 
however, might lead to a much smaller effect 
(Motley, 1987). 
The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, on 
the other hand, argues that a tax cut merely 
replaces current taxes with future taxes of an 
equal present value, hence tax cuts are 
inconsequential (Barsky, Mankiw & Zeldes, 
1986). Reducing taxes without cutting public 
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expenditure means that the government should 
increase its debt level to finance the expenditure. 
Given this situation, people know that they will 
have to pay higher taxes to repay the debt in the 
future, which will lower their future disposable 
income (Afzal, 2012). In other words, increases 
in public spending encourage households to 
reduce their current consumption since they 
recognise that the incremental government 
expenditure must be financed eventually by 
higher taxes (Motley, 1987). 
The impact of fiscal variables on the output 
of an economy can be seen in the sign and size 
of the fiscal multipliers. A positive multiplier 
implies that expansion in a fiscal variable leads 
to an increase in the GDP; whilst a negative 
multiplier means that expansion in a fiscal 
instrument causes a contraction in the GDP. 
Furthermore, Mankiw (2008) explains that a 
positive shock in government purchases 
increases the demand for goods and services; 
hence, it generates a positive multiplier. An 
increase in tax, on the other hand, is apt to 
generate a negative multiplier, as it depresses 
consumer spending. Empirical evidence 
supporting those arguments can be found in the 
works of Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002). 
As regards the size, Gonzalez-Garcia, 
Lemus, and Mrkaic (2013) explain that a 
spending multiplier greater than one means that 
the fiscal instrument is able to stimulate 
economic activities and boost the output to a 
greater value than that of the initial increase in 
the fiscal variable. The multiplier, however, 
might be less than one due to the presence of the 
crowding-out effect eroding the initial unitary 
increase in public spending. Mankiw (2008) 
explains that an increase in government 
purchases raises the demand for money and it 
consequently raises the interest rate. Since the 
interest rate is the cost of borrowing, the increase 
in the interest rate is likely to reduce the demand 
for investment goods. This effect might offset 
the expansionary effect of government 
purchases. 
Earlier researches provide a wide variety of 
sizes for the fiscal multiplier. Ilzetzki and Vegh 
(2008), for instance, document that the spending 
multiplier is about 0.63 for developing countries 
and 0.91 for high-income countries. Cogan et al. 
(2009), found that the tax multiplier is about –
0.3 whilst the spending multiplier is about 0.63. 
A more complete study of the size of fiscal 
multipliers in the literature can be found in 
Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler (2009) 
and Batini et al. (2014). 
Moreover, Alesina and Ardagna (2009) 
document that decreases in taxes are more 
expansionary than spending increases. In 
contrast, Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) 
and Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber 
(2012) suggest that the revenue multiplier is 
significantly smaller than the spending 
multiplier. Perotti (2004), found no evidence that 
tax cuts work faster or more effectively than 
increases in government expenditure. 
Batini et al. (2014) classify the determinants 
of fiscal multipliers into two main categories, 
which are structural characteristics and 
conjunctural/temporary/cyclical factors. The 
term structural refers to characteristics that are 
intrinsic in the economy over a longer period. 
This category comprises trade openness, labour 
market rigidity, the size of automatic stabilisers, 
the exchange rate regime, the level of debt and 
public expenditure’s management and revenue 
administration. Cyclical factors, on the other 
hand, refer to a series of temporary, non-
structural, circumstances that make the 
multipliers deviate from their “normal” level. 
The authors identify two main conjunctural 
factors, which are the state of the business cycle 
and the degree of monetary accommodation to 
fiscal shocks. 
The importance of the debt level in assessing 
fiscal policy’s impact can be derived from the 
work of Favero and Giavazzi (2007). The 
authors investigate the effects of fiscal shocks 
whilst keeping track of the debt’s dynamics and 
the responses of the fiscal variables to the level 
of public debt. They show that the absence of a 
debt feedback effect can result in incorrect 
estimates of the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks. 
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2. Public and Private Debt Level 
It has been mentioned earlier that the level of 
debt might affect the effectiveness of the fiscal 
variables. Kumar and Woo (2010) found 
evidence that there is a negative correlation 
between debt and growth. They suggest that on 
average, a 10 percent point increase in the initial 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown 
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 
0.2 percentage points per year. Similarly, 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) document 
that fiscal stimulus in economies with high 
levels of public indebtedness might become 
counter-productive. When debt levels are high, 
increases in government expenditure may act as 
a signal that fiscal tightening will be required in 
the near future. This is consistent with the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis that has been 
explained in the earlier section.  
Furthermore, the level of public borrowing is 
associated with debt’s sustainability, which is an 
important factor in determining the output effect 
of government purchases (Ilzetzki, Mendoza& 
Vegh, 2013). To achieve debt sustainability, 
countries need to increase tax revenues – despite 
such a policy being likely to lower the output of 
the economies (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). As 
debt levels increase, the ability of borrowers to 
repay becomes more uncertain; which results in 
a higher probability of default (Cecchetti, 
Mohanty& Zampolli, 2011) and larger risks to 
the fiscal budget and tax rates (Adam, 2010). In 
other words, the accumulation of debt involves 
risk. Corsetti et al. (2012), posit that a higher 
level of public debt may adversely affect 
economic activities. It becomes a sovereign risk 
channel, through which a country’s default risk 
leads to an increase in the cost of funding in the 
private sector. Hence, higher levels of public 
debt may adversely affect economic activities by 
increasing the financing costs for the private 
sector. 
Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012), 
however, found evidence that the growth-
reducing effects of high public indebtedness are 
not transmitted exclusively through high real 
interest rates. They suggest the distinct 
contribution of public debt overhangs in 
lowering the economic growth. A similar result 
is also documented in the work of Jorda, 
Schularick and Taylor (2013). Another 
explanation of why fiscal stimulus is less 
effective at higher levels of government debt 
comes from Berben and Brosens (2005). The 
authors show empirical evidence that in 
countries with a high level of public debt, any 
increase in government spending is partly 
crowded out by a fall in private consumption. An 
increasing government debt implies higher tax 
liabilities for households in the future, so banks 
become more reluctant to give them credit. As a 
result, households are less able to smooth 
consumption. 
The level at which public debt becomes a 
drag on economic growth varies among earlier 
studies. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) assert that 
the relationship between government debt and 
real GDP growth is weak for debt-to-GDP ratios 
of below 90 percent of GDP. Above that, median 
growth rates decrease by one percent and 
average growth falls considerably more. Several 
researchers, however, cast doubt on these 
findings. They demonstrate theoretical and 
empirical flaws and findings in the work of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Iron and Bivens 
(2010), for instance, state that the paper of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) overlooks the 
impact over time, or a more complicated 
dynamic relation between growth and debt. 
Moreover, Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2013) 
point out serious errors – such as coding errors, 
the selective exclusion of available data, and 
unconventional weighting of summary statistics 
– that leads to an inaccurate picture of the 
relationship between public debt and GDP’s 
growth. 
Furthermore, Minea and Parent (2012) also 
challenge the threshold level documented by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). They argue that the 
threshold level, if it exists, is somewhat higher, 
at around 115 percent. Below this level, 
increases in the level of debt damage growth; 
however, this negative effect is declining as 
public debt is increasing. Above this threshold, 
the link between public debt and economic 
growth changes sign. Cecchetti, Mohanty, and 
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Zampolli (2011) suggest that governments 
should keep the debt level below 85 percent of 
GDP to build a fiscal buffer. 
Besides investigating the impact of public 
debt, Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) 
also studied whether corporate and household 
debt show similar effects on the output of the 
economy to public debt. The authors found that 
both debts become a drag on the economic 
growth at 90 percent of GDP, for corporate debt 
and 85 percent of GDP for household debt. 
Similarly, they argue that over borrowing for 
individual households and firms leads to 
bankruptcy and financial ruin. Highly indebted 
borrowers can no longer be treated as 
creditworthy, so that lenders stop providing 
loans to them. Consequently, consumption and 
investment decrease. 
Nevertheless, Andres, Bosca, and Ferri 
(2014) documented a contradictory finding. 
They found that in an environment of high 
borrower’s debt, fiscal policy becomes more 
effective. This means that the impact of a fiscal 
stimulus on the output of the economy is 
intensified when the level of household debt is 
high. The researchers explain that the increase in 
government purchases leads to a rise in the price 
of assets. The presence of private debt thus 
opens up a powerful channel for fiscal stimuli 
that affect the value of collateral. When the loan 
to value ratio is sufficiently high – which means 
a higher household debt level – changes in the 
value of collateral have a strong marginal effect 
on consumption, over and above the reaction to 
the current labour income. This reduces the 
marginal utility of consumption, thus reinforcing 
workers’ bargaining power in wage negotiations, 
further increasing the labours’ income. The 
authors, however, posit that the effect of 
household debt on fiscal multipliers depends on 
the fiscal instrument used. When an increase in 
government purchases is financed by raising 
taxes on income, it will lower the fiscal 
multipliers. This is because a tax-based fiscal 
policy has a greater impact than a spending-
based policy (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009). 
Those aforementioned papers represent two 
contending approaches to viewing the impact of 
private debt on the output of an economy. The 
study of Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 
(2011) pointed out that private debt has a similar 
effect to public debt in moderating the fiscal 
policy’s effectiveness. In accordance with this 
view, Jorda, Schularik, and Taylor (2013) found 
that in advanced economies, significant financial 
stability risks have mostly come from private 
sector credit booms, rather than from the 
expansion of public debt. However, a high level 
of public debt is likely to exacerbate this effect. 
On the other hand, the finding of Andres, 
Bosca, and Ferri (2014) might show that private 
debt is merely one of the channels through which 
public debt affects the economic output. As 
documented by Checherita and Rother (2010), 
the level of public debt is negatively correlated 
with the interest rate. Higher public financing 
pushes up sovereign debt yields and increases 
the net flow of funds from the private sector into 
the public sector. This may lead to an increase in 
the private interest rate. Intuitively, households 
and firms become more reluctant to seek loans 
since they become more costly. Thus, according 
to this view, a higher public debt level is 
associated with a lower private debt level. 
Hence, a fiscal stimulus becomes more effective 
in the environment of high levels of private debt.  
3. Hypotheses 
The aforementioned literature review 
suggests the relationship among the variables 
fiscal stimuli, economic output, and debt level, 
which can be seen in the figure below. To see 
whether the fiscal policy is effective in 
stimulating the economy, the variables of fiscal 
stimuli – government expenditure and revenue – 
are treated as the predictors of the output of the 
economy. The debt level is one of the 
determinants of the fiscal multiplier’s size; hence 
it is expected to moderate the relationship 
between the dependent and independent 
variables.
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time the fiscal policy is initiated. Having said 
that and following the earlier studies, such as 
Perotti (2004) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa 
(2009), the one-year lagged value is also applied 
for the fiscal variables. Accordingly, the β2 
coefficient represents the effect of last year’s 
stimuli on the current real GDP growth. 
To see the moderating effect of the level of 
debt on the spending effect, one can add up the 
public and private debt levels in Equation (1) so 
we then have Equations (2) and (3). Note that 
GDebt refers to the government’s debt level 
whilst PDebt represents the private debt level. 
GDPGri.t = α + β1 GSpendGri.t +  
                  β2 GSpendGri.t-1 + β3 GDebti.t +  
                  β4 (GSpendGri.t x GDebti.t) +  
                  β5 (GSpendGri.t-1 x GDebti.t) +  
                  ui.t (2) 
GDPGri.t = α + β1 GSpendGri.t +  
                  β2 GSpendGri.t-1 + β3 PDebti.t +  
                  β4 (GSpendGri.t x PDebti.t) + 
    β5(GSpendGri.t-1 x PDebti.t) +  
                  ui.t (3) 
The moderating effect of public and private debt 
levels can be examined from the coefficient of β4 
and β5. As mentioned earlier, public debt is 
expected to negatively moderate the fiscal 
stimuli (H1) whilst private debt is expected to 
have a positive moderation effect (H2). The first 
hypothesis, accordingly, would appear to hold if 
the β4 and β5 of Equation (2) have positive 
values and are significantly not different from 
zero. This means that a higher level of public 
debt amplifies the spending effect on the econo-
mic output. Similarly, the second hypothesis 
might hold once the β4 and β5 of Equation (3) are 
significantly not different from zero, but with 
negative values. This means that a higher level 
of private debt would reduce the spending effect. 
As regards the fiscal effect of the revenue 
stimuli, we simply alter the variable GSpendGr 
in Equation (1) with GRevGr, which refers to the 
growth rate of government revenue; hence, the 
equation is as follows. 
GDPGri.t = α + β1 GRevGri.t + β2 GRevGri,t-1 + 
                  ui.t (4) 
For the moderation effect of the level of debt on 
the revenue effect, similarly, one can modify the 
earlier equations so we then have Equations (5) 
and (6) below. It is worth noting that the way to 
interpret the moderation effect hypotheses on the 
revenue’s effect is similar to that on the spending 
effect. 
GDPGri.t = α + β1 GRevGri.t + β2 GRevGri.t-1 +  
β3 GDebti.t + β4 (GRevGri.t x GDebti.t) + 
β5 (GRevGri.t-1 x GDebti.t) + ui.t (5) 
GDPGri.t = α + β1 GRevGri.t + β2 GRevGri.t-1 +  
         β3 PDebti.t + β4 (GRevGri.t x PDebti.t) + 
         β5 (GRevGri.t-1 x PDebti.t) + ui.t (6) 
Since the above formulae model the output 
economy merely from the perspective of the 
fiscal stimuli, one might worry about the omitted 
variables. Therefore, the variable of inflation is 
added into those models. The use of inflation as 
the control variable can also be found in Afonso, 
Gruner, and Kolerus (2010) and Qazizada and 
Stockhammer (2015). Controlling for inflation is 
crucial because the variable of GDP is expressed 
in real terms, whilst government spending is 
typically budgeted in nominal terms and income 
tax brackets are not indexed instantaneously 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). 
The aforementioned panel analysis so far 
tells us about the fiscal effect of both the 
spending and revenue stimuli on the output of an 
economy. As indicated at the very beginning, 
this paper also tries to assess the effectiveness of 
fiscal policies. Nevertheless, the output elasticity 
estimated from the above equations might not 
clearly explain the efficacy. Since the elasticity 
measures the percentage increase in GDP growth 
per one percent increase in fiscal stimuli, one 
cannot see the dollar impact on the output. To 
examine how effective one dollar spent by the 
government is in stimulating the economy, one 
should see another measure, which is the fiscal 
multiplier. 
There are several ways to measure the fiscal 
multiplier. Depending on the time frame used, 
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one can calculate several multipliers, which are 
the impact multiplier, the multiplier at some 
horizon N, the peak multiplier and the cumula-
tive multiplier (Spilimbergo, Symansky & 
Schindler, 2009). Instead of investigating all the 
multipliers, this research will focus its analysis 
merely on the impact and cumulative multipliers. 
Unlike the cumulative multiplier which 
measures the longer effects of fiscal stimuli, the 
impact multiplier focuses on the impact at the 
moment the fiscal instrument changes (Ilzetzki, 
Mendoza & Vegh, 2013). The use of the impact 
and cumulative multipliers can be seen, for 
instance, in the work of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). 
To calculate the impact multiplier, one 
should divide the elasticity by the ratio of real 
spending/revenue to GDP (Jain and Kumar, 
2013). Note that the spending elasticity in 
Equations (2) and (3) should not be calculated 
simply based on the coefficient of GSpendGr or 
GRevGr. Rather, one should take the coefficient 
of the interaction with public and private debt 
levels into account. The formulae for calculating 
the impact multiplier of spending and revenue 
are as follows. 
Spending impact 
multiplier = 
ீ஽௉ீ௥/ீௌ௣௘௡ௗீ௥
ீௌ௣௘௡ௗ/ீ஽௉  (7)
Revenue impact 
multiplier 
= 
ீ஽௉ீ௥/ீோ௘௩ீ௥
ீோ௘௩/ீ஽௉  (8)
The notation of ܩܵ݌݁݊݀/ܩܦܲ and	ܩܵ݌݁݊݀/
ܩܦܲ , consecutively, indicates the government 
spending and government revenue as a 
proportion of the total GDP. The denominators 
refer to the median value of government 
expenditure and revenue to the real GDP ratio 
among the economies studied. This is because 
the median is said to be more representative of 
the typical value of a series (Brooks, 2014). The 
cumulative multiplier is calculated simply by 
adding up the impact multipliers over the time 
frame considered. In this case, the cumulative 
multiplier would be the sum of the impact 
multipliers within the year of the fiscal 
implementation and the year after. 
1. Data and Variables 
The analysis is conducted based on data 
retrieved from the World Development 
Indicators database, available at the website of 
the World Bank (last updated on 14 April 2015). 
The database provides yearly datasets of 214 
economies from 1960 to 2013. As mentioned 
before, a balanced panel dataset will first be 
formed; hence, one needs to filter the data and 
remove some incomplete data points. This 
filtering process results in a balanced panel 
dataset consisting of 16 countries over the period 
from 1996 to 2012 (giving 272 points of 
observation). Considering the data’s availability, 
moreover, the unbalanced panel that can be 
created for the robustness check covers 39 
countries over the period from 1991 to 2012. 
The data required for the panel regression 
analysis comprises five variables, which are the 
output of the economy, government spending, 
government revenue, public debt, and the level 
of private debt. For the first variable, the most 
widely used measure to assess economic output 
is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This variable 
consists of four components, which are 
consumption, investment, government purchases 
and net exports. Most of the earlier works use 
real GDP – instead of nominal GDP – to assess 
the changes in the economies’ outputs. This 
variable is a better gauge of economic well-
being than is nominal GDP, as it is not affected 
by changes in prices (Mankiw, 2008). In this 
paper, similar to most of the earlier works, real 
GDP is utilised to assess the changes in 
economies’ outputs, expressed in their annual 
growth rates. 
Regarding the spending-based fiscal stimuli, 
earlier researchers employed several approaches. 
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), this 
paper defines the variable of government spend-
ing as the sum of the government’s consumption 
and investment. For additional analysis, this 
study considers to decompose the spending 
multiplier into a consumption multiplier and an 
investment multiplier. Distinguishing between a 
consumption and investment multiplier can be 
found in the work of Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, 
and Mrkaic (2013) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and 
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Vegh (2013). They argue that the composition of 
expenditure is crucial in determining the effect 
of fiscal stimuli. This paper also includes the 
revenue-based fiscal stimuli to analyse the fiscal 
policy’s impact. Similar to Alesina and Ardagna 
(2009), the impact of a revenue-based policy on 
the fiscal multiplier is examined using the total 
tax revenue of each economy as the percentage 
of total GDP. 
Regarding the variable of the level of public 
debt, a few researchers, such as Leibfritz, 
Roseveare, and Noord (1994), refer the public’s 
indebtedness to the general government debt that 
covers all governmental levels, such as local, 
state, and central government. This measure, 
however, is available only for a few countries. In 
this paper, therefore, the public debt’s level is 
referred to as the central government debt, as a 
percentage of the total GDP; the most widely 
used measure by previous researchers. This 
variable covers both the domestic and foreign 
liabilities of the central government that are 
outstanding on the last day of the fiscal year. 
The last variable is the level of private debt. 
Whilst Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014) refer this 
merely to the households’ leverage, this paper 
provides a broader view of that variable by 
employing the level of domestic credit to the 
private sector. The World Bank explains that this 
measure consists of the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by financial 
institutions, such as through loans, and trade 
credits or other accounts receivable, which 
establishes a claim for repayment. This measure, 
hence, is expected to cover both the corporate 
and household levels. 
2. Summary Statistics 
To provide a data snapshot of those 
aforementioned variables, the descriptive statis-
tics are summarised in table 1 below. 
From the table, we point out that the 
economies tended to implement expansionary 
fiscal policies during the last two decades by 
increasing their governments’ expenditures and 
reducing the tax revenues. Regarding the 
governments’ spending, the governments are 
inclined to stimulate their economies through an 
increase in government consumption. It is clear 
from the table that the range of debt levels across 
countries is very wide. This indicates a high 
variability in the levels of public and private debt 
among the economies. 
In Table 2, one can see the correlation 
coefficient among the variables. As can be seen 
from the table, there is no high correlation 
among the explanatory variables that might lead 
to a multicollinearity problem. The exception is 
between government investment growth and 
government spending growth, for which the 
coefficient is close to 100 percent. As explained 
in the earlier chapter, these two variables will 
not be used as dependent variables in the same 
regression model since this research mainly uses 
the government spending growth as the proxy of 
spending-based fiscal stimuli. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 
GDPGr 
(%) 
GConsGr 
(%) 
GInvestGr 
(%) 
GSpendGr 
(%) 
GRevGr 
(%) 
GDebt 
(%) 
PDebt 
(%) 
Mean 3.08 0.55 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 57.96 82.45 
Median 3.25 -0.37 0.08 0.27 -0.04 51.95 75.60 
Standard Deviation 3.55 5.12 9.16 5.21 6.46 32.74 45.77 
Maximum 15.24 43.62 35.90 25.60 32.56 163.56 217.42 
Minimum -14.74 -10.13 -32.55 -22.01 -28.36 4.10 18.56 
Skewness -0.78 2.70 0.14 0.56 -0.25 0.51 0.94 
Kurtosis 3.25 18.28 2.96 5.49 4.89 -0.33 0.63 
Source: The World Bank database; data processed (2015) 
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Table 2 Correlation among Variables 
 GDPGr GConsGr GInvestGr GSpendGr GRevGr GDebt PDebt 
GDPGr 1.00 -0.37 0.56 0.42 0.04 -0.12 -0.37 
GConsGr  1.00 -0.32 0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 
GInvestGr   1.00 0.91 0.20 -0.06 -0.13 
GSpendGr    1.00 0.18 -0.06 -0.11 
GRevGr     1.00 0.03 -0.07 
GDebt      1.00 0.08 
PDebt       1.00 
Source: The World Bank database; data processed (2015) 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Spending Multipliers 
Four approaches of the panel regression are 
performed, which are a pooled OLS, a country 
fixed effect, a time fixed effect, and a country 
and time fixed effect. The results show that 
implementing both country and time fixed 
effects increases the reliability of the regression 
analysis. Performing the redundant fixed effects 
tests, the results strongly reject the null 
hypotheses that the fixed effects are redundant. 
This means that both fixed effects are necessary 
and the pooled sample could not be employed 
(Brooks, 2014). For the next analysis, 
accordingly, the paper will present merely the 
regression implementing both the country and 
time fixed effects. 
Revisiting the earlier section, one can 
analyse the moderating effect of public and 
private debt levels on the spending multiplier 
using the Equations (2) and (3), consecutively, 
and comparing them to the basic Equation (1). 
Table 3 below shows the regression results of 
those three equations. Having the estimates in 
column (1), one can see that spending stimulus 
significantly affects the economy, during both 
the implementing year and the year after. 
Moreover, the positive value of the estimates 
indicates that an increase in government 
spending leads to a boost in the real GDP. This 
result is consistent with Keynesians’ arguments. 
From the table, we can also see that having the 
interaction variable of the level of public debt 
does not alter the earlier result. It seems that the 
public debt’s level does not moderate the 
spending multiplier since neither the estimate of 
“GSpendGr x GDebt” nor “GSpendGr(-1) x 
GDebt” is statistically different from zero. 
Controlling for the variable of private debt’s 
level, on the other hand, one can find different 
results. In this model, the level of private debt 
shows a positive moderation effect on the 
spending stimuli contemporaneously. This 
means that an increase in the level of private 
debt might amplify the spending effect on output 
within the year of implementation. 
It is worth noting that the variable of private 
debt itself appears to behave as an independent 
variable, since it produces a significant estimate. 
As it not only interacts with the predictor 
variable but also is a predictor itself, one might 
call private debt a quasi-moderator (Sharma, 
Durand & Gur-Arie, 1981). The significant 
negative impact of private debt on GDP might 
cancel out the earlier positive moderating effect 
on the contemporaneous spending stimuli.  
The above regressions provide the estimates 
of real GDP growth due to the changes in the 
governments’ spending growth ( ܩܦܲܩݎ/
ܩܵ݌݁݊݀ܩݎ ). As explained before, one should 
calculate the fiscal multiplier to find out the 
impact of each dollar spent by a government. 
Having the spending elasticity, we can calculate 
the impact and cumulative multiplier for the 
fiscal policy using Equation (7). The table below 
exhibits the calculated results of the size of the 
impact and cumulative multipliers during the 
two-year period. 
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Table 3 Public Spending Effect on Economic Output 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 2.7276*** 
(0.30) 
9.17 1.9343** 
(0.96) 
2.02 5.4036*** 
(0.69) 
7.80 
GSpendGr 0.1909*** 
(0.03) 
6.27 0.2327*** 
(0.06) 
4.18 0.0609 
(0.06) 
0.99 
GSpendGr(-1) 0.0597** 
(0.03) 
1.99 0.0539 
(0.05) 
1.00 0.0141 
(0.06) 
0.24 
GDebt   0.0124 
(0.01) 
0.83   
GSpendGr x GDebt   -0.0006 
(0.00) 
-0.83   
GSpendGr(-1) x GDebt   0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.11   
PDebt     -0.0307*** 
(0.01) 
-4.02 
GSpendGr x PDebt     0.0015** 
(0.00) 
2.02 
GSpendGr(-1) x PDebt     0.0005 
(0.00) 
0.65 
Inflation 0.0813 
(0.08) 
1.08 0.1014 
(0.08) 
1.31 0.0712 
(0.07) 
1.00 
R2 0.6397  0.6421  0.6826  
Adjusted R2 0.5862  0.5833  0.6304  
SE of regression 2.32  2.33  2.19  
F-stat 11.95  10.91  13.08  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 256  256  256  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
 Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
Table 4 Impact and Cumulative Multipliers of Public Spending  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Non-moderated 
GDebt-
moderated PDebt-moderated 
Elasticity 0.1909 0.2003 0.1780 
Cumulative elasticity 0.2507 0.1780 0.2285 
Total spending to GDP ratio 0.4325 0.4325 0.4325 
Impact multiplier 0.4414 0.4613 0.4115 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) 0.5795 0.5973 0.5283 
Note: The elasticity values in column (2) and (3) are calculated by adding the estimate of “GSpendGr” 
or “GConsGr” or “GInvestGr” with the relevant estimate of the interaction variables (i.e. 
“GConsGr x GDebt”) multiplied by the median value of the respecting moderator value; whilst 
the elasticity values in column (1) are simply the estimate of “GSpendGr” or “GConsGr” or 
“GInvestGr”. The cumulative elasticity is calculated by summing up the elasticity value of the 
contemporaneous and lagged effect for each component of government expenditure. The ratio on 
GDP refers to the median value of each component of expenditure to the GDP ratio. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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Without controlling the debt level, the size of 
the impact multiplier is around 0.44 whilst that 
of the cumulative multiplier is between 0.58 – 
0.59. This result is quite similar to the earlier 
findings. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
documented the size of the impact multiplier for 
the first four quarters as being between 0.45 – 
0.55 and the cumulative multiplier after eight 
quarters is between 0.54 – 0.65. 
Considering the interaction with public debt, 
both the impact and cumulative multipliers show 
a slight increase to 0.46 and 0.60, consecutively. 
This result does not seem to support the earlier 
studies, which suggest a negative effect of 
government debt on the spending multiplier. 
Regarding the impact of private debt, on the 
other hand, one can point out a decrease in the 
spending multipliers. This finding is in line with 
the work of Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 
(2011) and Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2013), 
which argued that the level of private debt 
becomes a drag on economic growth. Having 
this evidence, in addition, the Hypotheses H1 and 
H2 do not seem to hold. 
As mentioned earlier, this paper also tries to 
find out the spending effect from the perspective 
of each of its elements. The analysis follows 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013) which put 
public consumption and investment altogether in 
one model. The table below exhibits the results 
for the consumption and investment effects. 
As one can see, decomposing government 
expenditure into its separate elements increases 
the reliability of the model by more than five 
percent. The result, moreover, shows that both 
public consumption and investment significantly 
affect the economic output. Unlike the positive 
direction of public expenditure, however, each 
element has an opposite direction, one to 
another. Whilst public investment follows the 
same direction as public expenditure, govern-
ment consumption appears to have a negative 
association with GDP growth. At one point, this 
finding is in line with Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, 
and Mrkaic (2013) arguing that public 
investment is more effective in stimulating an 
economy compared to public consumption. The 
result also suggests that the economy might view 
the spending instrument used by the government 
differently. This advocates the finding of 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013), arguing 
that the composition of expenditure may have an 
important role in determining the impact of the 
fiscal stimuli, especially in developing countries. 
 
Table 5 Public Consumption and Investment Effects on Economic Output 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 2.8840*** 
(0.27) 
10.62 3.1865*** 
(0.89) 
3.58 5.0401*** 
(0.66) 
7.62 
GConsGr -0.1123*** 
(0.03) 
-3.55 -0.1685*** 
(0.05) 
-3.47 -0.0719 
(0.05) 
-1.46 
GConsGr(-1) -0.0396 
(0.03) 
-1.29 -0.0557 
(0.05) 
-1.20 -0.0192 
(0.05) 
-0.40 
GDebt   -0.0057 
(0.01) 
-0.41   
GConsGr x GDebt   0.0015 
(0.00) 
1.64   
GConsGr(-1) x GDebt   0.0005 
(0.00) 
0.59   
PDebt     -0.0257*** 
(0.01) 
-3.51 
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GConsGr x PDebt     -0.0006 
(0.00) 
-0.76 
GConsGr(-1) x PDebt     -0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.26 
GInvestGr 0.1322*** 
(0.02) 
7.66 0.1605*** 
(0.03) 
5.25 0.1224*** 
(0.03) 
3.50 
GInvestGr(-1) 0.0510*** 
(0.02) 
2.99 0.0585** 
(0.03) 
1.95 0.0362 
(0.03) 
1.06 
GInvest x GDebt   -0.0004 
(0.00) 
-1.04   
GInvest(-1) x GDebt   -0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.40   
GInvest x PDebt     -0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
GInvest(-1) x PDebt     0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.14 
Inflation 0.0738 
(0.07) 
1.08 0.0754 
(0.07) 
1.08 0.0775 
(0.07) 
1.15 
R2 0.7049  0.7149  0.7254  
Adjusted R2 0.6580  0.6618  0.6743  
SE of regression 2.11  2.10  2.06  
F-stat 15.02  13.48  14.20  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 256  256  256  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
          Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
 
Having the interaction with debt, one cannot 
observe a moderating effect of both public and 
private debt on each component of total 
spending. This result is different from the 
previous result, which viewed governments’ 
consumption and investment as total spending. 
Previously, the contemporaneous moderating 
effect of private debt appeared to be the case on 
total public spending. Similar to the earlier 
analysis, on the other hand, one can still find that 
the level of private debt has a negative and 
significant interaction with the dependent 
variable. 
To see how the decomposition of govern-
ment expenditure affects the impact and 
cumulative multipliers, one can see this in Table 
6. As one can see, both the impact and 
cumulative multipliers of public consumption 
are negative and they become less negative with 
the increase in the public debt’s level. This 
pattern is different from the pattern of the 
spending multipliers in the earlier analysis, in 
which the size of the multipliers goes up with the 
public debt. A similar pattern to the previous 
setting can be found in the multipliers of public 
investment. Considering the interaction with 
private debt, one can see that in general the size 
of the multipliers goes down with private debt, 
except for the contemporaneous multiplier of 
public consumption. The same pattern is found 
in the previous analysis of the spending multi-
pliers. Having the aforementioned evidence, one 
might argue that the spending multipliers are 
driven mainly by the governments’ investment. 
2017 Adi 223 
Table 6 Impact and Cumulative Multipliers of Public Consumption and Investment  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION    
Elasticity -0.1123 -0.0921 -0.1145 
Cumulative elasticity -0.1518 -0.1217 -0.1487 
Consumption to GDP ratio  0.1921  0.1921  0.1921 
Impact multiplier -0.5844 -0.4795 -0.5961 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) -0.7902 -0.6336 -0.7738 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT    
Elasticity 0.1322 0.1386 0.1174 
Cumulative elasticity 0.1832 0.1886 0.1581 
Investment to GDP ratio 0.2335 0.2335 0.2335 
Impact multiplier 0.5662 0.5936 0.5029 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) 0.7845 0.8076 0.6772 
Note: The elasticity values in column (2) and (3) are calculated by adding the estimate of “GConsGr” or 
“GInvestGr” with the relevant estimate of the interaction variables (i.e. “GConsGr x GDebt”) multiplied by 
the median value of the respecting moderator value; whilst the elasticity values in column (1) are simply the 
estimate of “GConsGr” or “GInvestGr”. The cumulative elasticity is calculated by summing up the 
elasticity value of the contemporaneous and lagged effect for each component of government expenditure. 
The ratio on GDP refers to the median value of each component of expenditure to the GDP ratio. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
 
2. Spending Multipliers 
Similar to the earlier steps, a series of 
regressions based on Equations (4), (5) and (6) is 
run to see the impact of public and private debt 
levels on the revenue multipliers. Table 7 
presents the regression results pertaining to the 
revenue-based policy’s impact. 
As one can see from the table above, there is 
a negative relationship between government tax 
revenues and real GDP growth. This means that 
reducing taxes seems to be an expansionary 
policy. The result, however, is statistically not 
different from zero. This evidence advocates the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis’s argument 
that tax cuts are likely to have no significant 
impact on the economic output. This is because 
the current tax cuts are likely to be compensated 
for with increased taxes in the future (Barsky, 
Mankiw & Zeldes, 1986). 
From the table, we can see no moderating 
effect of both the public and private debt levels. 
This can be seen from the estimate of the 
interaction variables, which are not significantly 
different from zero. This finding shows that 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 do not seem to make the 
case for the revenue multiplier. Similar to the 
analysis of the impact of spending, one can see 
that private debt appears to be the explanatory 
variable of economic output. Like in the analysis 
of spending’s effects, higher private debt levels 
are associated with lower GDP growth. 
To calculate the impact and cumulative 
multipliers of the revenue-based policy and to 
see how they react with the levels of public and 
private debt, one can use Equation (8). The result 
can be seen in Table 8 below. 
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Table 7 Government Revenue’s Effect on Economic Output 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 2.7423*** 
(0.33) 
8.42 2.6530** 
(1.04) 
2.55 6.3416*** 
(0.72) 
8.80 
GRevGr -0.0396 
(0.03) 
-1.47 -0.0403 
(0.06) 
-0.66 -0.0098 
(0.05) 
-0.20 
GRevGr(-1) -0.0091 
(0.03) 
-0.33 0.0389 
(0.06) 
0.68 0.0018 
(0.05) 
0.04 
GDebt   0.0016 
(0.02) 
0.10   
GRevGr x GDebt   0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.09   
GRevGr(-1) x GDebt   -0.0009 
(0.00) 
-0.96   
PDebt     -0.0429*** 
(0.01) 
-5.54 
GRevGr x PDebt     -0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.63 
GRevGr(-1) x PDebt     -0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
Inflation 0.0878 
(0.08) 
1.07 0.0873 
(0.09) 
1.02 -0.0060 
(0.08) 
1.14 
R2 0.5758  0.5776  0.6280  
Adjusted R2 0.5127  0.5082  0.5668  
SE of regression 2.52  2.53  2.38  
F-stat 9.13  8.32  10.27  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 256  256  256  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
       Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
Table 8 Impact and Cumulative Multipliers of Government Revenue  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
Elasticity -0.0396 -0.0355 -0.0279 
Cumulative elasticity -0.0487 -0.0425 -0.0309 
Revenue to GDP ratio  0.1877  0.1877  0.1877 
Impact multiplier -0.2107 -0.1892 -0.1488 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) -0.2594 -0.2265 -0.1645 
Note: The elasticity values in column (2) and (3) are calculated by adding the estimate of “GRevGr” with the 
relevant estimate of the interaction variables (i.e. “GRevGr x GDebt”) multiplied by the median value of the 
respecting moderator value; whilst the elasticity values in column (1) are simply the estimate of “GRevGr”. 
The cumulative elasticity is calculated by summing up the elasticity value of the contemporaneous and 
lagged effect for each component of government expenditure. The ratio on GDP refers to the median value of 
each component of expenditure to the GDP ratio. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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It is obvious from the table that all the 
multipliers are negative, which means that an 
increase in the governments’ revenues is apt to 
reduce the output of the economies. Without 
considering the interaction with debt, the size of 
the impact multiplier is around 0.21 – 0.24 
whilst that of the cumulative multiplier is 
between 0.26 – 0.30. In the earlier literature, the 
revenue multipliers vary widely, ranging from -
1.5 to 1.4 (Spilimbergo, Symansky & Schindler, 
2009). Our finding is quite close to what Batini, 
Callegari, and Melina (2012) documented in the 
case of Japan, which is around -0.3 and -0.2. 
Taking the interaction with debt into 
account, the impact and cumulative multipliers 
go down with an increase in both the public and 
private levels of debt. As one can see, private 
debt seems to make a higher contribution to 
reducing the multipliers of the revenue’s effect 
than public debt. From this result, moreover, one 
can find that private debt consistently reduces 
the size of the fiscal multipliers for both the 
spending and revenue stimuli. Public debt, on 
the other hand, shows a different effect on the 
multipliers. 
As regards the size, one can find that an 
increase in government spending is likely to 
generate higher multiplier effects than a tax cut. 
The former instrument produces impact and 
cumulative multipliers of around 0.41 – 0.60 
whilst the latter accounts for about 0.15 – 0.30. 
This finding supports the earlier evidence 
documented by Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa 
(2009) and Baum, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and 
Weber (2012), arguing that decreases in taxes 
are less expansionary than spending increases. 
3. Robustness Check 
To check whether those results are robust, 
the same analysis is conducted but with the 
different set of data, which is the unbalanced 
panel. As explained earlier, the use of this 
unbalanced panel enables us to extend the cross-
sectional data as well as the time series. In this 
panel setting, the analysis observes 39 
economies from 1991 to 2012. To begin with, 
the regression results of the spending stimuli 
based on an unbalanced panel data set is 
provided in table 9 below. 
Having the results in Table 9, one can find 
that the pure effect of the spending stimuli is 
robust for both types of panel data set; it 
generates a positive and significant estimate of 
GDP growth. In addition, utilising the 
unbalanced panel leads the result to be more 
statistically significant. Considering the interac-
tion with public debt, one can observe a positive 
moderation effect on the contemporaneous 
spending effect, as indicated by the positive and 
significant value of the “GSpendGr x GDebt” 
coefficient. This finding cannot be found when 
utilising the balanced panel. Moreover, 
government debt appears to behave as an 
explanatory variable of GDP growth. It shows a 
negative association with the output of the 
economy at the 10 percent significance level. 
This result is in line with the literature arguing 
that the level of public debt should become a 
drag on the economy. 
Regarding the interaction with private debt, 
one can find similar results with the earlier 
analysis on the balanced panel. The moderating 
effect of private debt seems to be the case in 
both panel settings. In addition, analysing data 
from the unbalanced panel leads the result to be 
more statistically significant. The possible 
explanation as to why one observes results that 
are more significant is due to the increase in the 
number of observations. As one can see, the 
unbalanced panel has twice the data points that 
the balanced panel has. 
Before presenting the calculation of the 
spending multipliers for the unbalanced panel, 
Table 10 presents the regression results for the 
spending elements, which are public 
consumption and investment. From the basic 
(non-moderated) model, it is shown that the 
result for public investment does not change. 
The result for public consumption, on the other 
hand, becomes insignificant compared to the 
balanced panel version. This means that the 
negative association of public consumption with 
economic output, found previously in the 
balanced panel, is not robust. This result is 
similar to that of Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, and 
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Mrkaic (2013), who found that the effect of 
government consumption on GDP is statistically 
not different from zero. This evidence, 
moreover, emphasises the previous result 
arguing that government investment is likely to 
have a stronger effect in stimulating the 
economy than government consumption does. 
 
Table 9 Public Spending Effect (Unbalanced Panel) 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 3.4549*** 
(0.09) 
37.38 4.2019*** 
(0.42) 
10.01 5.0710*** 
(0.30) 
16.82 
GSpendGr 0.1247*** 
(0.01) 
10.12 0.0722** 
(0.03) 
2.47 0.0744*** 
(0.02) 
4.60 
GSpendGr(-1) 0.0668*** 
(0.01) 
5.49 0.0741*** 
(0.03) 
2.63 0.0477*** 
(0.02) 
3.03 
GDebt   -0.0125* 
(0.01) 
-1.80   
GSpendGr x GDebt   0.0010** 
(0.00) 
2.04   
GSpendGr(-1) x GDebt   -0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.41   
PDebt     -0.0208*** 
(0.00) 
-5.44 
GSpendGr x PDebt     0.0011*** 
(0.00) 
4.55 
GSpendGr(-1) x PDebt     0.0004 
(0.00) 
1.60 
Inflation -0.0114*** 
(0.00) 
-10.46 -0.0108*** 
(0.00) 
-9.63 -0.0106*** 
(0.08) 
-9.20 
R2 0.5474  0.5655  0.5765  
Adjusted R2 0.5096  0.5198  0.5388  
SE of regression 2.56  2.51  2.48  
F-stat 14.47  12.36  15.27  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 792  673  783  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
       Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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Table 10 Public Consumption and Investment Effect (Unbalanced Panel) 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 3.4859*** 
(0.10) 
36.55 4.3821*** 
(0.42) 
10.54 5.0021*** 
(0.30) 
16.63 
GConsGr -0.0025 
(0.01) 
-0.20 -0.0519** 
(0.03) 
-2.07 0.0137 
(0.01) 
0.92 
GConsGr(-1) -0.0070 
(0.01) 
-0.60 -0.0520** 
(0.02) 
-2.19 0.0053 
(0.01) 
0.37 
GDebt   -0.0156** 
(0.01) 
-2.27   
GConsGr x GDebt   0.0010** 
(0.00) 
2.03   
GConsGr(-1) x GDebt   0.0012*** 
(0.00) 
2.67   
PDebt     -0.0190*** 
(0.00) 
-4.96 
GConsGr x PDebt     -0.0005* 
(0.00) 
-1.70 
GConsGr(-1) x PDebt     -0.0004 
(0.00) 
-1.21 
GInvestGr 0.0464*** 
(0.01) 
8.19 0.0574*** 
(0.02) 
3.20 0.0269*** 
(0.01) 
4.35 
GInvestGr(-1) 0.0248*** 
(0.01) 
4.42 0.0193 
(0.01) 
1.40 0.0151** 
(0.01) 
2.44 
GInvest x GDebt   0.0006** 
(0.00) 
2.34   
GInvest(-1) x GDebt   0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.33   
GInvest x PDebt     0.0008*** 
(0.00) 
6.38 
GInvest(-1) x PDebt     0.0004*** 
(0.00) 
2.92 
Inflation -0.0109*** 
(0.00) 
-9.77 -0.0104*** 
(0.00) 
-9.40 -0.0103*** 
(0.00) 
-8.99 
R2 0.5267  0.5850  0.5854  
Adjusted R2 0.4858  0.5383  0.5459  
SE of regression 2.62  2.47  2.46  
F-stat 12.86  12.52  14.83  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 792  673  783  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
       Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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Having the interaction with the level of debt, 
one can observe a moderation effect of public 
debt on both government consumption and 
investment. This effect cannot be found when 
the analysis is conducted based on the balanced 
panel data set. In addition, it is obvious from the 
table that public debt also negatively interacts 
with GDP growth. This result is also the case 
when the analysis is conducted based on total 
government expenditure. 
As regards private debt, one can also observe 
the moderation effect on government investment 
as well as government consumption. It seems 
that private debt has a positive effect on 
investment stimuli but a negative effect on 
consumption stimuli. In the balanced panel 
setting, these effects do not appear to be the 
case. Moreover, it is noticeable that the 
moderation effect on public investment is 
statistically more significant than that on public 
consumption. In this panel setting, one can also 
observe that private debt has a negative and 
significant estimate on the dependent variable. 
Table 11 provides the size of multipliers 
based on the unbalanced panel data set. As can 
be seen from the table, both public and private 
debts are likely to increase the size of the impact 
and cumulative multipliers. The biggest impact 
of public debt on the multipliers is observed in 
the case of public investment. Private debt, 
furthermore, shows a similar pattern. Comparing 
these results with the previous analysis, this 
finding is quite different from that in the 
balanced panel data set. In the earlier analysis, 
spending and investment multipliers are apt to 
increase with public debt and decrease with 
private debt. The consumption multiplier, on the 
other hand, tends to show the opposite pattern to 
the others. 
Next, the robustness check for revenue’s 
effect on economic output is provided in Table 
12 below. 
Table 11 Multipliers of Public Spending and Its Components (Unbalanced Panel)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
TOTAL SPENDING    
Elasticity 0.1247 0.1255 0.1457 
Cumulative elasticity 0.1915 0.1891 0.2194 
Total spending to GDP ratio 0.4281 0.4281 0.4281 
Impact multiplier 0.2913 0.2932 0.3403 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) 0.4473 0.4417 0.5125 
CONSUMPTION    
Elasticity -0.0025 0.0002 -0.0179 
Cumulative elasticity -0.0095 0.0107 -0.0352 
Consumption to GDP ratio  0.1848 0.1848  0.1848 
Impact multiplier -0.0133 0.0013 -0.0967 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) -0.0513 0.0577 -0.1906 
INVESTMENT    
Elasticity 0.0464 0.0922 0.0781 
Cumulative elasticity 0.0712 0.1163 0.1178 
Investment to GDP ratio 0.2385 0.2385 0.2385 
Impact multiplier 0.1945 0.3867 0.3273 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) 0.2984 0.4875 0.4939 
Note: The elasticity values in column (2) and (3) are calculated by adding the estimate of “GSpendGr” or 
“GConsGr” or “GInvestGr” with the relevant estimate of the interaction variables (i.e. “GConsGr x 
GDebt”) multiplied by the median value of the respecting moderator value; whilst the elasticity values in 
column (1) are simply the estimate of “GSpendGr” or “GConsGr” or “GInvestGr”. The cumulative 
elasticity is calculated by summing up the elasticity value of the contemporaneous and lagged effect for each 
component of government expenditure. The ratio on GDP refers to the median value of each component of 
expenditure to the GDP ratio. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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Table 12 Government Revenue Effect (Unbalanced Panel) 
 Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 3.5944*** 
(0.11) 
32.02 4.7232*** 
(0.48) 
9.74 6.2437*** 
(0.43) 
14.52 
GRevGr 0.0083 
(0.01) 
0.62 -0.0081 
(0.02) 
-0.33 0.0151 
(0.02) 
0.84 
GRevGr(-1) 0.0028 
(0.01) 
0.23 0.0175 
(0.03) 
0.69 -0.0060 
(0.02) 
-0.38 
GDebt   -0.0203** 
(0.01) 
-2.52   
GRevGr x GDebt   0.0003 
(0.00) 
0.89   
GRevGr(-1) x GDebt   -0.0003 
(0.00) 
-0.78   
PDebt     -0.0339*** 
(0.01) 
-6.34 
GRevGr x PDebt     -0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.88 
GRevGr(-1) x PDebt     0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.78 
Inflation -0.0107*** 
(0.00) 
-7.78 -0.0101*** 
(0.00) 
-7.59 -0.0104*** 
(0.00) 
-7.78 
R2 0.4519  0.4973  0.4873  
Adjusted R2 0.3967  0.4401  0.4320  
SE of regression 2.87  2.72  2.80  
F-stat 8.18  8.69  8.82  
Prob. (F-stat) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
# of observation 667  627  659  
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note: *** = significant at 1 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; * = significant at 10 percent; 
 Figures in parentheses refer to standard error of variables 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
 
From the table, one can see that the 
governments’ tax revenues generate a positive 
correlation with real GDP growth. However, the 
estimates are statistically not different from zero. 
It means that a revenue-based stimulus is apt to 
be inconsequential in affecting the economy. 
Regarding the interaction with the debt level, the 
result shows that the moderation effect of both 
public and private debt does not hold for revenue 
stimuli. This result is also the case in the 
balanced panel setting. The only different result 
from the earlier analysis is that one can observe 
in the unbalanced panel that public debt shows a 
negative and significant relationship with the 
dependent variable. 
For further analysis, Table 13 below presents 
the calculation of the revenue multipliers based 
on the above result. As one can see, the 
multipliers of revenue stimuli are all positive. 
This result is different from the revenue 
multipliers of the balanced panel, which are all 
negative. From the table, one can see that the 
size of the multipliers is close to zero. The 
multipliers, furthermore, tend to increase with 
public debt but decrease with private debt. This 
pattern appears to change compared to that 
found in the balanced panel setting. Previously, 
both public and private debt lowered the revenue 
multipliers.
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Table 13 Multipliers of Government Revenue (Unbalanced Panel) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Non-moderated GDebt-moderated PDebt-moderated 
Elasticity 0.0083 0.0096 0.0055 
Cumulative elasticity 0.0111 0.0114 0.0076 
Revenue to GDP ratio 0.1769 0.1769 0.1769 
Impact multiplier 0.0469 0.0542 0.0310 
Cumulative multiplier (2yrs) 0.0626 0.0643 0.0432 
Note: The elasticity values in column (2) and (3) are calculated by adding the estimate of “GRevGr” with the 
relevant estimate of the interaction variables (i.e. “GRevGr x GDebt”) multiplied by the median value of the 
respecting moderator value; whilst the elasticity values in column (1) are simply the estimate of “GRevGr”. 
The cumulative elasticity is calculated by summing up the elasticity value of the contemporaneous and lagged 
effect for each component of government expenditure. The ratio on GDP refers to the median value of each 
component of expenditure to the GDP ratio. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
 
CONCLUSION 
Many studies have been conducted to examine 
the impact of debt on fiscal multipliers. Most of 
the earlier works, however, focused their 
analysis merely on public debt. This paper 
attempts to fill a gap in the literature by taking 
both public and private debt into account. Unlike 
Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014) who 
investigated the impact of private debt from the 
view of household debt in the US economy, this 
paper provides a broader perspective by 
employing data of the domestic credit provided 
to the private sector in several countries. This 
variable can be expected to cover both corporate 
and household leverage. 
In this paper, fiscal policies are classified 
into two main categories, which are the spending 
effect and revenue stimuli. Regarding the pure 
effect of spending stimuli on economic output, 
one can observe a positive and significant 
correlation between government spending and 
GDP growth. The result is robust for both types 
of panel setting. This finding advocates the basic 
Keynesian theory arguing that an increase in 
government spending will boost the economy. 
Furthermore, decomposing public spending 
into its elements – which are government 
consumption and investment – one may observe 
robust evidence that government investment 
appears to be more effective in stimulating the 
economy. This finding is in line with that 
documented by Gonzalez-Garcia, Lemus, and 
Mrkaic (2013). Government consumption, on the 
other hand, surprisingly shows a negative 
relationship with GDP growth. Nevertheless, this 
result is not robust. Moreover, this finding 
suggests that the composition of government 
expenditure does matter in assessing the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies. 
As regards a revenue-based fiscal policy, one 
can see an insignificant result for both of the 
data sets. It indicates that changes in government 
revenue are likely to have no impact on 
economic output. This result supports the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis explaining that 
current tax cuts are merely replaced by higher 
taxes in the future. Similar findings can be found 
in the work of Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes 
(1986). 
Considering the moderating effect of public 
debt, no robust evidence can be found to support 
the argument that government debt moderates 
the spending effect on output. The moderating 
effect of public debt on spending appears only in 
the unbalanced panel analysis. Similarly, this 
moderation effect also does not seem to be the 
case in the revenue analysis. It is worth noting, 
however, that public debt interacts with the 
dependent variable (GDP growth). One may 
observe that an increase in public indebtedness is 
likely to reduce the economic output. This 
finding is consistent with the earlier studies 
documenting a negative association of public 
debt on the economy. 
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Regarding private debt’s impact, one might 
observe a robust moderating effect of private 
debt on spending stimuli. When the spending 
stimuli are decomposed into consumption and 
investment, this effect is not robust and shows a 
mixed pattern (positive and negative moderation 
effects) across the two panel data sets. Pertaining 
to that effect on revenue stimuli, private debt 
does not show any moderating effect, both in the 
balanced and unbalanced panel sets. Never-
theless, we can find robust evidence that private 
debt interacts negatively with economic output. 
This finding is not in line with the work of 
Andres, Bosca, and Ferri (2014). Conversely, it 
seems to support the findings of Cecchetti, 
Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) and Jorda, 
Schularik, and Taylor (2013), arguing that over 
borrowing by the private sector is likely to 
dampen economic output. 
In this paper, two types of multiplier are 
employed, which are the impact and cumulative 
multipliers. The table below provides a summary 
of all the multipliers in several settings. As one 
can see, the spending impact multiplier has a 
positive value ranging from 0.29 to 0.44, whilst 
the cumulative multiplier is between 0.45 and 
0.58. The size of the multipliers shows no 
significant changes when interacting with public 
debt. Similarly, private debt does not really alter 
the result. Looking at the spending components, 
government investment appears to be much more 
effective as the expansionary instrument than 
government consumption. This finding supports 
the argument that it is crucial to analyse a 
spending policy’s effectiveness on each of its 
components separately, since it might produce 
different results. Regarding the revenue multi-
pliers, the impact multiplier is around -0.21 to 
0.05 whilst the cumulative multiplier accounts 
for -0.26 to 0.06. This result remains constant 
with public debt but decreases slightly when it 
interacts with private debt. 
Finally, one might argue that the use of a 
panel regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between fiscal instruments and the 
output of the economy might be subject to an 
endogeneity bias. This paper, however, narrows 
the analysis by focusing on the moderating effect 
when it is viewed in a one-way causality. To get 
a more comprehensive perspective of a fiscal 
policy’s effectiveness, one might utilise the 
SVAR (Structural Vector Auto Regressions) 
approach or instrumental variables. Moreover, 
this paper does not classify the economies into 
sub samples based on their country-specific 
characteristics, such as the level of development, 
exchange rate regime, or openness to trade. 
Taking that approach into account might be 
beneficial in providing a more comprehensive 
result about the impact of public and private debt 
on a fiscal policy’s effectiveness. 
Table 14 Summary of Fiscal Multipliers  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pure Effect Public Debt Effect Private Debt Effect 
BALANCED PANEL    
Spending  0.44  ;  0.58  0.46  ;  0.60  0.41  ;  0.53 
Consumption -0.58  ; -0.79 -0.48  ; -0.63 -0.60  ; -0.77 
Investment  0.57  ;  0.78  0.59  ;  0.81  0.50  ;  0.68 
Revenue -0.21  ; -0.26 -0.19  ; -0.23 -0.15  ; -0.16 
UNBALANCED PANEL    
Spending  0.29  ;  0.45  0.29  ;  0.44  0.34  ;  0.51 
Consumption -0.01  ; -0.05  0.00  ;  0.06 -0.10  ; -0.19 
Investment  0.19  ;  0.30  0.39  ;  0.49  0.33  ;  0.49 
Revenue  0.05  ;  0.06  0.05  ;  0.06  0.03  ;  0.04 
Note: The first figure in each column refers to the impact multiplier whilst the next one is the cumulative multiplier 
for two years. 
Source: The World Bank database; regression result (2015) 
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